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1 Introduction
Advances in technology and new levels of automation on commercial jet
transports has had many effects. There have been positive effects from both
an economic and a safety point of view. The technology changes on the flight
deck also have had reverberating effects on many other aspects of the aviation
system and different aspects of human performance. Operational experience,
research investigations, incidents, and occasionally accidents have shown that
new and sometimes surprising problems have arisen as well (Figure 1).
What are these problems with cockpit automation, and what should we learn
from them?
Do they represent over-automation or human error?
Or instead perhaps there is a third possibility - they represent
coordination breakdowns between operators and the automation?
Are the problems just a series of small independent glitches revealed by
specific accidents or near misses?
Do these glitches represent a few small areas where there are cracks to be
patched in what is otherwise a record of outstanding designs and systems?
Or do these problems provide us with evidence about deeper factors that
we need to address if we are to maintain and improve aviation safety in a
changing world?
How do the reverberations of technology change on the flight deck
provide insight into generic issues about developing human-centered
technologies and systems (Winograd and Woods, 1997)?
Based on a series of investigations of pilot interaction with cockpit
automation (Sarter and Woods, 1992; 1994; 1995; 1997a, 1997 b), supplemented
by surveys, operational experience and incident data from other studies (e.g.,
Degani et al., 1995; Eldredge et al., 1991; Tenney et al., 1995; Wiener, 1989), we
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have found that the problems that surround crew interaction with
automation are more than a series of individual glitches. These difficulties
are symptoms that indicate deeper patterns and phenomena concerning
human-machine cooperation and paths towards disaster. In addition, we find
the same kinds of patterns behind results from studies of physician
interaction with computer-based systems in critical care medicine (e.g., Moll
van Charante et al., 1993; Obradovich and Woods, 1996; Cook and Woods,
1996). Many of the results and implications of this kind of research are
synthesized and discussed in two comprehensive volumes, Billings (1996)
and Woods et al. (1994).
This paper summarizes the pattern that has emerged from our research,
related research, incident reports, and accident investigations. It uses this;
new understanding of why problems arise to point to new investment
strategies that can help us deal with the perceived "human error" problem,
make automation more of a team player, and maintain and improve safety.
The ability to step back and assess the implications of the research results was
facilitated tremendously by our participation in a FAA team that examined
the interface between flight crews and modern flight deck systems (Abbott et
al., 1996). In this project, we were able to discuss the implications of observed
difficulties with crew-automation coordination for investments to improve
safety with a broad range of stakeholders in the aviation domain, including
carrier organizations, line pilots, training managers, manufacturers, and
industry groups. This effort helped us step back and assess the implications o f
the research for future investments to maintain and enhance aviation safety
and safety in other related areas where new investments in automation are
changing the roles of operational personnel.

Insert figure 1 about here
Figure 1. The Reverberations of Technology Change on the Flightdeck for
Human Performance.
2 Impact of Technology Change on Cognition and Collaboration
One way to recognize the pattern that underlies automation and human error
is to listen to the voices we heard in our investigations. In these studies we
interacted with many different operational people and organizations,
• directly in conversations about the impact of automation,
• through their judgments as expressed in surveys about cockpit
automation,
through their reported behavior in incidents that occurred on the line,
through their performance in simulator studies that examined the
coordination between crew and automated systems in specific flight
contexts.
We will summarize the results of the multiple converging studies by
adopting the point of view of different stakeholders and by expressing the
research results and issues in their words. The statements are paraphrases of
actual statements made to us in different contexts.
2.1 Automation Surprises:
Coordination Breakdowns Between Crews and Automation
Pilots and instructors described and revealed the clumsiness and complexity
of many modern cockpit systems. They described aspects of cockpit
automation that were strong but sometimes silent and difficult to direct when
time is short. We saw and heard how pilots face new challenges imposed by
the tools that are supposed to serve them and provide "added functionality."
The users' perspective on the current generation of automated systems is best
expressed by the questions they pose in describing incidents (extended from
Wiener, 1989):
• What is it doing now?
• What will do next?
• How did I get into this mode?
• Why did it do this?
• Stop interrupting me while I am busy.
• I know there is some way to get it to do what I want.
• How do I stop this machine from doing this?
• Unless you stare at it, changes can creep in.
These questions and statements illustrate why one observer of human-
computer interaction defined the term agent as "A computer program
whose user interface is so obscure that the user must think of it as a quirky,
but powerful, person ..." (Lanir, 1995, p. 68).
Questions and statements like these point to automation _ul'prises (Sarter,
Woods and Billings, 1997), i.e., situations where crews are surprised by actions
taken (or not taken) by the autoflight system. Automation surprises begin
with miscommunication and misassessments between the automation and
users which lead to a gap between the user's understanding of what the
automated systems are set up to do, what they are doing, and what they are
going to do. The initial trigger for such a mismatch can arise from several
sources, for example, erroneous inputs such as mode errors or indirect mode
changes where the system autonomously changes its status and behavior
based on its interpretation of pilot inputs, its internal logic and sensed
environmental conditions (Sarter and Woods, 1995; Sarter and Woods, 1997
a). The gap results in the crew being surprised later when the aircraft's
behavior does not match the crew's expectations. This is where questions
like, "Why won't it do what I want?" "How did I get into this mode?" arise.
It seems that the crew generally does not notice their misassessment from
displays of data about the state or activities of the automated systems. The
misassessment is detected, and thus the point of surprise is reached, in most
cases based on observations of unexpected and sometimes undesirable aircraft
behavior. Once the crew has detected the gap between expected and actual
aircraft behavior, they can begin to respond to or recover from the situation.
The problem is that this detection generally occurs when the aircraft behaves
in an unexpected manner-flying past the top of descent point without
initiating the descent, or flying through a target altitude without leveling off.
If the detection of a problem is based on actual aircraft behavior, it may not
leave a sufficient recovery interval before an undesired result occurs.
Unfortunately, there have been accidents where the misunderstanding
persisted too long to avoid disaster (cf., Billings, 1996).
The evidence shows strongly that the potential for automation surprises is
greatest when three factors converge:
1. automated systems act on their own without immediately preceding
directions from their human partner,
2. gaps in users' mental models of how their machine partners work in
different situations, and
3. weak feedback about the activities and future behavior of the agent
relative to the state of the world.
Automation surprises are one kind of breakdown in the coordination
between crews and automated systems. Our investigations revealed a
"funnel" of evidence about these kinds of coordination breakdowns. If we
observe crews interacting with cockpit automation in full mission
simulations, we find direct evidence of a variety of performance problems
linked to the design of automation and to the training users receive. The
problems observed are sometimes the result of "classic" human-computer
interface design characteristics that lead to certain predictable forms of human
error. If we look at operational experience we find that these coordination
breakdowns and errors occur occasionally, but, in most cases, with no
significant consequences. Unfortunately, we also have a small number of
near misses or accidents where these same coordination breakdowns between
crew and automation are a significant contributor to the sequence of events.
In other words, there is a chain where:
• characteristics of the interface between automated systems and flight crews
affect human performance in predictable and sometimes negative ways,
• there are precursor events where these performance problems occur but in
innocuous circumstances or where the sequence of events is later
redirected away from bad outcomes,
• occasionally, these problems occur in the context of more vulnerable
circumstances, with other contributors present, and events spiral towards
disaster.
2.2 The Going Sour Accident
These breakdowns in coordination between crew and automation create the
potential for a particular kind of accident sequence - the "going sour"
accident (originally based on results from studying operating room incidents;
Cook, Woods and McDonald, 1991). In this general class of accidents, an
event occurs or a set of circumstances come together that appear to be minor
and unproblematic, at least when viewed in isolation or from hindsight.
This event triggers an evolving situation that is, in principle, possible to
recover from. But through a series of commissions and omissions,
misassessments and miscommunications, the human-automation team
manages the situation into a serious and risky incident or even accident. In
effect, the situation is managed into hazard.
Several recent accidents involving automation surprises show this signature.
While they are classically referred to in aviation as controlled flight into
terrain, some of these cases may better be described as managed flight into
terrain since the automated systems are handling the aircraft and the flight
crew is supervising the automation (for a brief overview of one vivid
example of managed flight into terrain see Sarter et al., 1997).
The going sour scenario seems to be a side effect of complexity. Research and
incident data raise the concern that new technology, when developed in a
technology-driven rather human-centered way, is increasing the operational
complexity and increasing the potential for the going sour signature (Billings,
1996).
After-the-fact, going sour incidents look mysterious and dreadful to outsiders
who have complete knowledge of the actual state of affairs (Woods et al.,
1994). Since the system is managed into hazard, in hindsight, it is easy to see
opportunities to break the progression towards disaster. The benefits of
hindsight allow reviewers to comment (Woods et al., 1994, chapter 6),
• "How could they have missed X, it was the critical piece of information?"
• "How could they have misunderstood Y, it is so logical to us?"
• "Why didn't they understand that X would lead to Y, given the inputs,
past instructions and internal logic of the system?"
In fact, one test for whether an incident is a going sour scenario is to ask
whether reviewers, with the advantage of hindsight, make comments such
as, "All of the necessary data was available, why was no one able to put it all
together to see what it meant?"
The lesson learned from recent accidonts involving breakdowns in the
coordination between the automation and the flight crew is:
• the going sour scenario is an important general kind of accident category,
• there is a concern that this category represents a significant portion of the
residual risk_ in aviation.
Only future data and events will reveal whether this is a growing part of the
risk. Investments in turning cockpit automation into a team player and in
training crews to better manage automated resources in a wide range of
circumstances produce pay offs by guarding against this type of accident
scenario.
Luckily, going sour accidents are relatively rare even in very complex
systems. The going sour progression is usually blocked because of two factors:
• the expertise embodied in operational systems and personnel allows
practitioners to avoid or stop the incident progression;
• the problems that can erode human expertise and trigger this kind of
scenario are significant only when a collection of factors or exceptional
circumstances come together.
3 Human Expertise and Technology-Induced Complexity
In our investigations we heard a great deal about how operators' expertise
usually compensates for the features of automation that contribute to
coordination breakdowns. We heard about how training departments, line
organizations, and individuals develop ways (through policies, procedures,
team strategi_ individual tactics and tricks) to get the job done successfully
despite the clumsiness of some automated systems for some situations. Some
of these are simply cautionary notes to pilots reminding them to "be careful,
it can burn you." Some are workarounds embodied in recipes. Some are
strategies for teamwork. Many are ways to restrict the use of portions of the
suite of automation in general or in particularly difficult situations. In other
words, deficiencies in the design of the automation from a Human Factors
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point of view produce so few bad consequences because of human expertise
and adaptation (Woods et al., 1994, chapter 5).
Overall, operational people and organizations tailor their behavior to manage
the technology as a resource to get their job done, but there are limits on their
ability to do this. Crew training is one of the primary tools for developing
strategies and skills for managing automated systems as a set of resources (e.g.,
transition training as pilots move to a new glass cockpit aircraft and recurrent
training). But there are many constraints that limit the amount and range of
training experiences pilots can receive. When we talked to training
managers, we heard:
• "They're building a system that takes more time than we have for training
people."
• "There is more to know--how it works, but especially how to work the
system in different situations."
• "The most important thing to learn is when to click it off."
• "We need more chances to explore how it works and how to use it."
• "Well, we don't use those features or capabilities."
• "We've handled that problem with a policy."
• "We are forced to rely on recipe training much more than anyone likes."
• "We teach them [a certain number of] basic modes in training, they learn
the rest of the system on the line."
Economic and competitive factors produce great pressure to reduce the
training investment (e.g., shrink the training footprint or match a
competitor's training footprint). When there are improvements in training,
these same forces lead people to take the benefit in productivity (the same
level of proficiency in less time) rather than in quality (better training in the
same time). People seem to believe that greater investments in automation
promise lower expenditures on developing human expertise. However, the
data consistently show that the impact of new levels and types of automation
is new knowledge requirements for people in the system as their role changes
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to more of a manager and anomaly handler (e.g., Sarter et al., 1997). The goal
of enhanced safety requires that we expand, not shrink, our investment in
human expertise.
3.1 Complexity
The second reason why we see only a few accidents with the going sour
signature is that breakdowns in coordination between human and
automation are significant only when a collection of factors or exceptional
circumstances come together. For example,
• human performance is eroded due to local factors (fatigue) or systemic
factors (training and practice investments),
• crew coordination is weak,
• the flight circumstances are unusual and not well matched with training
experiences,
• transfer of control between crew and automation is late or bumpy,
• small, seemingly recoverable erroneous actions occur, interact and add up.
Because there are always multiple contributors to a going sour incident and
because these incidents evolve over time and a series of stages, it is easy to
identify a host of places where a small change in human, team, or machine
behavior could have re-directed the sequence away from any trouble.
Focusing on any one of these points in isolation can lead to very local and
manageable changes -- just shift the display slightly, modify a checklist, issue a
bulletin to remind crews of how X works in circumstance Y, reinforce a
policy, add some remedial training.
While these changes may be constructive in small ways, they miss the larger
lessons of this incident signature. When people and automation seem to
mismanage a minor occurrence or non-routine situation into larger trouble,
it is a symptom of overall system complexity. It is a symptom that all of the
contributors to successful flight deck performance - design, training,
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operational policies and procedures, certification - need to be better
coordinated.
3.2 The Escalation Principle
An underlying contributor to problems in human-automation coordination
is the escalation principle (Woods et al., 1994). There is a fundamental
relationship where the greater the trouble in the underlying process or the
higher the tempo of operations, the greater the information processing
activities required to cope with the trouble or pace of activities. For example,
demands for monitoring, attentional control, information, and
communication among team members (including human-machine
communication) all tend to go up with the unusualness (situations at or-
beyond margins of normality or beyond textbook situations), tempo and
criticality of situations. If workload or other burdens are associated with
using a computer interface or with interacting with an autonomous or
intelligent machine agent, these burdens tend to be concentrated at the very
times when the practitioner can least afford new tasks, new memory
demands, or diversions of his or her attention away from the job at hand to
the interface per se. This is the essential trap of clumsy automation (Wiener,
1989)
4 Designer Reactions to Coordination Breakdowns:
Erratic Human Behavior
Listen to how designers respond when they are confronted with evidence of a
breakdown in the coordination between people and automation:
• The hardware/software system "performed as designed" (crashes of
"trouble free" aircraft).
12
• "Erratic" human behavior (variations on this theme are "diabolic" human
behavior; "brain burps," that is, some quasi-random degradations in
otherwise skillful human performance; irrational human behavior).
• The hardware/software system is "effective in general and logical to us,
some other people just don't understand it" (e.g., those who are too old,
too computer phobic, or too set in their old ways).
• Those people or organizations or countries "have trouble with modern
technology."
• "We only provided what the customer asked for!" (or "we tried to talk
them out of it, but we have to be customer-centered").
• "I wanted to go further but ..." - I was constrained by - compatibility with
the previous design, supplier's standard designs, cost control, time
pressure, regulations.
• Other parts of the industry "haven't kept up" with the advanced
capabilities of our systems (e.g., ATC does not accommodate the advanced
capabilities and characteristics of the newer aircraft or ATC does not
recognize what is difficult to do with highly automated aircraft under time
pressure).
Some of these comments reflect real and serious pressures and constraints in
the design world (e.g., design for multi-cultural users, economic pressures,
very complex arrival and departure procedures).
4.1 Escaping from Attributions of Human Error versus Over-Automation
Overall, these kinds of comments from developers show how we remain
locked into a mindset of thinking that technology and people are
independent components --either this electronic box failed or that human
box failed. Too many reviewers and stakeholders, after-the-fact, attribute
going sour incidents either to
• human error -"clear misuse of automation ... contributed to crashes of
trouble free aircraft" (La Burthe, 1997) or to
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* over-automation - "... statements made by ... Human Factors specialists
agains_automafion 'per se' " (La Burthe, 1997).
This opl:n_ition is a profound misunderstanding of the factors that influence
human performance. One commentator on human-computer interaction
makes this point by defining the term interface as "an arbitrary line of
demarcation set up in order to apportion the blame for malfunctions" (Kelly-
Bootie, 1995, p. 101).
The primary lesson from careful analysis of incidents and disasters in a large
number of industries is that going sour accidents represent a breakdown in
coordination between people and technology (e.g., Norman, 1990). People
cannot be thought about separately from the technological devices that are
supposed to assist them. Technological artifacts can enhance human
expertise or degrade it, "make us smart" or "make us dumb" (Norman, 1993).
The bottom line of recent research is that technology cannot be considered in
isolation from the people who use and adapt it (e.g., Hutchins, 1995a).
Automation and people have to coordinate as a joint system, a single team
(Hutchins, 1995b; Billings, 1996). Breakdowns in this team's coordination is
an important path towards disaster. The real lessons of this type of scenario
and the potential for constructive progress comes from developing better
ways to coordinate the human and machine team - human-centered design
(Winograd and Woods, 1997).
Accident analyses suggest that breakdowns in human performance are a
contributor to about 70 or 75% of aviation mishaps. Similar tabulations in
other industries come up with about the same percentage. This should be
interpreted as a motivation for paying increased attention to Human Factors.
But some view these statistics superficially as an indication of a human error
problem, and, as a result, they want to eliminate the human element, provide
remedial training, or dictate all pilot action through expanded procedures.
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However, research on the human contribution to safety and risk has found
that "human error" is a symptom of deeper issues (Woods et al., 1994). To
learn about these issues and constructively improve the system in which
people function, these researchers have found that we need to go behind the
label human error to identify and analyze the factors that influence human
performance. In other words, there are organizational, training and design
factors that influence human performance in predictable ways.
One simple and classic example of a kind of design induced error is the case of
mode errors. Mode errors occur when an operator executes an intention in a
way that would be appropriate if the device were in one configuration (one
mode) when it is, in fact, in a different configuration. Note that mode errors -.
are not simply just human error or a machine failure. Mode errors are a kind
of human-machine system breakdown in that it takes both a user who loses
track of the current system configuration, and a system that interprets user
input differently depending on the current mode of operation (Sarter and
Woods, 1995 a; Woods et al., 1994, chapter 5). The potential for mode error
increases as a consequence of a proliferation of modes and interactions across
modes without changes to improve the feedback about system state and
activities. The resulting coupling, complexity and opacity of the automated
system makes it difficult to train operators adequately for monitoring and
managing these systems especially given resource limits for training. The
result is gaps and misconceptions in users' mental models of the automated
system. In this example as in others, human, technological, and
organizational factors interact, each affecting and being affected by the others.
Human Factors began and has always been concerned with the identification
of design-induced error (ways in which things make us dumb) as one of its
fundamental contributions to improved system design (e.g., Fitts, 1946; Fitts
and Jones, 1947; Fitts, 1951 in the aviation domain). However, it is a
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profound misunderstanding of the research results to think that this implies
a shift from- 'the incident was caused by pilot error or operator error" - to -
'the incident was caused by manager or designer error'. We make no progress
if we trade pilot error for designer or manager error (Woods et al., 1994).
There are always multiple contributors to failure each necessary but only
jointly sufficient. Design and organizational factors often are a part of the set
of contributors. But again the potential for progress comes from
understanding the factors that lead designers or managers inadvertently to
shape human performance towards predictable forms of error through the
clumsy use of technology or through inappropriate organizational pressures.
4.2 Strategies for Human-Centered Design
If diagnoses such as human error (be it operator, designer or manager) or
over-automation are misleading and unproductive, then how do we make
progress?
A necessary first step is to adopt "human-centered" approaches to research
and design (Billings, 1996). This perspective can be characterized in terms of
three basic attributes: Human-centered design is problem-driven, activity-
centered, and context-bound (Winograd and Woods, 1997).
1. Human-centered research and design is problem-driven.
A problem-driven approach begins with an investment in understanding and
modeling the basis for error and expertise in that field of practice. What are
the difficulties and challenges that can arise? How do people use artifacts to
meet these demands? What is the nature of collaborative and coordinated
activity across people in routine and exceptional situations?
2: Human-centered research and design is activity-centered.
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In building and studying technologies for human use, researchers and
designers often see the problem in terms of two separate systems (the human
and the computer) with aspects of interaction between them. This focuses
attention on the people or the technology in isolation, de-emphasizing the
activity that brings them together. In human-centered design we try to make
new technology sensitive to the constraints and pressures operating in the
actual field of activity (Ehn, 1988; Flach and Dominguez, 1995).
New possibilities emerge when the focus of analysis shifts to the activities of
people in a field of practice. These activities do or will involve interacting
with computers in different ways, but the focus becomes the practitioner's
goals and activities in the underlying task domain. The question then
becomes (a) how do computer-based and other artifacts shape the cognitive _
and coordinative activities of people in the pursuit of their goals and task
context and (b) how do practitioners adapt artifacts so that they function as
tools in that field of activity (Woods, in press).
3" Human-centered research and design is context-bound.
Human cognition, collaboration, and performance depend on context. A
classic example is the representation effect - a fundamental and much
reproduced finding in Cognitive Science. How a problem is represented
influences the cognitive work needed to solve that problem, either
improving or degrading performance (e.g., Zhang and Norman, 1994). In
other words, the same problem from a formal description, when represented
differently, can lead to different cognitive work and therefore different levels
of performance. Another example is the data overload problem. At the heart
of this problem is not so much the amount of data to be sifted through.
Rather, this problem is hard because what data is informative depends on the
context in which it appears. Even worse, the context consists of more than
just the state of other related pieces of data; the context also includes the state
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of the problem solving process and the goals and expectations of the people
acting in that situation.
Today, in most cases, new technology is developed based on its hypothesized
impact on human cognition, collaboration, and performance (Winograd and
Woods, 1997; Sarter et al., 1997; Woods, in press). Well-intentioned
developers feel their work is human-centered because they are motivated
thoughtful people, because they predict the new system will lead to
improvements in performance, and because eventually they addressed the
usability of the system developed. Despite such good intentions,
development usually remains fundamentally technology-centered because
developing the technology in itself is the primary activity around which all
else is organized. The primary focus is pushing the technological frontier or
creating the technological system, albeit a technology that seems to hold
promise to influence human cognition, collaboration and activity.
Eventually, interfaces are built which connect the technology to users. These
interfaces typically undergo some usability testing and usability engineering
to make the technology accessible to potential users. Knowledge of human-
computer interaction and usability come into play, if at all, only at this later
stage. However, there is a gap between designers' intentions to be user-
centered and their actual technology-driven practice, which results in
operational complexities like those on the automated flight deck. In other
words, "the road to technology-centered systems is paved with user-centered
intentions" (see Sarter et al., 1997).
5 Progress Depends on ...
At the broadest level, researchers have identified a few basic human-centered
strategies that organizations can follow in an effort to increase the human
contribution to safety:
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• increase the system's tolerance to errors,
• avoid excess operational complexity,
• evalua_ changes in technology and training in terms of their potential to
create specific kinds of human error,
• increase skill at error detection by improving the observability of state,
activities and intentions,
• invest in human expertise.
To improve the human contribution to safety several steps are needed.
Design, operational, research, and regulatory organizations must all work
together to adopt methods for error analysis and use them as part of design
and certification. This creates a challenge to the Human Factors community -
- to work with industry to turn research results into practical methods (valid
but resource economical) that test for effective error tolerance and detection.
The goal is to improve the ability to detect and eliminate design and other
factors that create predictable errors.
5.1 Avoid Excess Operational Complexity
Avoiding excess operational complexity is a difficult issue because no single
person or organization decides to make systems complex. But in the pursuit
of local improvements or in trying to accommodate multiple customers,
systems gradually get more and more complex as additional features, modes,
and options accumulate. The cost center for this increase in complexity is the
user who must try to manage all of these features, modes and options across a
diversity" of: operational circumstances. Failures to manage this complexity
are categorized as "human error." But the source of the problem is not inside
the person. The source is the accumulated complexity from an operational
point of view. Trying to eliminate "erratic" behavior through remedial
training will not change the basic vulnerabilities created by the complexity.
Neither will banishing people associated with failures. Instead human error
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is a symptom of systemic factors.
involve coordination of multiple parties in the industry.
system approach must start with meaningful information
that predictably affect human performance.
The solutions are system fixes that will
This coordinated
about the factors
Mode simplification is illustrative of the need for change and the difficulties
involved. Not all modes are used by all pilots or carriers due to variations in
operations and preferences. Still they are all available and contribute to
complexity. Not all modes are taught in transition training; only a set of
"basic" modes is taught, and different carriers define different modes as
"basic." Which modes represent excess complexity and which are essential
for safe and efficient operation? Another indication of the disarray in this
area is that modes which achieve the same purpose have different names on
different flight decks.
Making progress in simplifying requires coordination across an international,
multi-party industry that is competitive in many ways but needs to be
collaborative in others.
One place where mode simplification is of very great importance is the
interaction across modes (indirect mode changes or mode reversions).
Indirect mode changes have been identified as a major factor in breakdowns
in teamwork between pilots and automation. Simplifying these transitions
and making transitions better fit pilot models is another very high priority
area for improvement.
5.2 Error Detection through Improved Feedback
Research has shown that a very important aspect of high reliability human-
machine systems is effective error detection. Error detection is improved by
providing better feedback, especially feedback about the future behavior of the
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aircraft, its systems or the automation. In general, increasing complexity can
be balanced with improved feedback. Improving feedback is a critical
investment area for improving human performance and guarding against
going sour scenarios. But where and how to invest in better feedback?
One area of need is improved feedback about the current and future behavior
of the automated systems. As technological change increases machines'
autonomy, authority and complexity, there is a concomitant need to increase
observability through new forms of feedback emphasizing an integrated
d.vnamic picture of the current situation, agent activities, and how these may
evolve in the future. Increasing autonomy and authority of machine agents
without an increase in observability leads to automation surprises. As
discussed earlier, data on automation surprises has shown that crews
generally do not detect their miscommunications with the automation from
displays about the automated system's state, but rather only when aircraft
behavior becomes sufficiently abnormal.
This result is symptomatic of low observability where observability is the
technical term that refers to the cognitive work needed to extract meaning
from available data. This term captures the relationship among data, observer
and context of observation that is fundamental to effective feedback.
Observability is distinct from data availability, which refers to the mere
presence of data in some form in some location. For human perception, "it is
not sufficient to have something in front of your eyes to see it" (O'Regan,
1992, p.475).
Observability refers to processes involved in extracting useful information. It
results from the interplay between a human user knowing when to look for
what information at what point in time and a system that structures data to
support attentional guidance (see Rasmussen, 1985; Sarter, Woods and
Billings, 1997). The critical test of observability is when the display suite helps
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practitioners notice more than what they were specifically looking for or
expecting (Sarter and Woods, 1997 a).
One example of displays with very low observability on the current
generation of flight decks is the flight mode annunciations on the primary
flight display. These crude indications of automation activities contribute to
reported problems with tracking mode transitions. As one pilot mentioned
to us, "changes can always sneak in unless you stare at it." Simple
injunctions for pilots to look closely at or call out changes in these indications
generally are not effective ways to redirect attention in a changing
environment. Minor tuning of the current mode annunciations is not very
likely to provide any significant improvement in feedback. Researchers and
industry need to cooperate to develop, test and adopt fundamentally new
approaches to inform crews about automation activities.
The new concepts need to be:
• transition-oriented -- provide better feedback about events and transitions,
• future-oriented -- the current approach generally captures only the current
configuration; the goal is to highlight operationally significant sequences
and reveal what should happen next and when,
• pattern-based -- pilots should be able to scan at a glance and quickly pick up
possible unexpected or abnormal conditions rather than have to read and
integrate each individual piece of data to make an overall assessment.
For example, making vertical navigation modes more comprehensible and
usable is likely to require some form of vertical profile display. The moving
map display for horizontal navigation is a tremendous example of the desired
target-- an integrated display that provides a big picture of the current
situation and especially the future developments in a way that supports quick
check reading and trouble detection. However, developing displays to
support vertical navigation based on the above criteria is much more difficult
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because it is inherently a four dimensional problem. The industry as a whole
needs to develop and test new display concepts to support pilot management
of vertical navigation automation.
Going sour incidents and accidents provide evidence that improved feedback
is needed. Despite the conflict with economic pressures, prudence demands
that we begin to make progress on what is better feedback to support better
error detection and recovery. To do this we need a collaborative process
among manufacturers, carriers, regulators, and researchers to prototype, test
in context, and adopt new innovations to aid awareness and monitoring. W e
need to move forward on this to ensure that, when the next window of
opportunity opens up, we are ready to provide more observable and
comprehensible automation.
5.3 How to Provide Better Feedback: Bumpy Transfer of Control
Let us look at one example of a coordination breakdown between crews and
flight deck automation. Automation can compensate for trouble silently
(Norman, 1990). Crews can remain unaware of the developing trouble until
the automation nears the limits of its authority or capability to compensate.
The crew may take over too late or be unprepared to handle the disturbance
once they take over, resulting in a bumpy transfer of control and significant
control excursions. This general problem has been a part of several incident
and accident scenarios. One example of this is asymmetric lift conditions
caused by icing or engine trouble.
In contrast, in a well-coordinated human team, the active partner would
comment on the unusual difficulty or increasing effort needed to keep the
relevant parameters on target. Or, in an open environment, the supervisor
could notice the extra work or effort exerted by his or her partner and ask
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about the difficulty, investigate the problem, or intervene to achieve overall
safety goals,
How can we use the analogy to a well coordinated human team working in
an open visible environment to guide how we can provide more effective
feedback and better coordination between human and machine partners? For
the set of feedback problems that arise when automation is working at the
extreme ends of its envelope or authority, improved displays and warnings
when
turbulence);
• when the automation is taking extreme action or moving towards the
extreme end of its range of authority;
when agents are in competitior_ for control of a flight surface.
need to indicate:
the automation is having trouble handling the situation (e.g.,
This specifies a performance target. The design question is how to make the
system smart enough to communicate this intelligently? How to define what
are "extreme" regions of authority in a context sensitive way? When is an
agent having trouble in performing a function, but not yet failing to perform?
How and when does one effectively communicate moving towards a limit
rather than just invoking a threshold crossing alarm?
From experience and research we know some constraints on the answers to
these questions. Threshold crossing indications (simple alarms) are not smart
enough - thresholds are often set too late or too early. We need a more
gradual escalation or staged shift in level or kind of feedback. An auditory
warning that sounds whenever the automation is active (e.g., an auditory
signal for trim-in-motion) may very well say too much. We want to indicate
trouble in performing the function or extreme action to accomplish the
function, not simply any action.
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We know from experiences in other domains and with similar systems that
certain errors can occur in designing feedback. These include:
• nuisance communication such as voice alerts that talk too much in the
wrong situations,
• excessive false alarms,
• distracting indications when more serious tasks are being handled (e.g., a
constant trim warning or a warning that comes on at a high noise level
during a difficult situation -- "silence that thing!").
In other words, misdesigned feedback can talk too much, too soon or it can be
too silent, speaking up too little, too late as automation moves towards
authority limits.
Should the feedback occur visually or through the auditory channel or
through multiple indications? Should this be a separate new indication or
integrated into existing displays? Should the indication be of very high
perceptual salience; in other words, how strongly should the signal capture
pilot attention? Working out these design decisions requires developing
prototypes in terms of:
• perceptual salience relative to the larger context of other possible events
and signals,
• along a temporal dimension (when to communicate relative to the
priority of other issues or activities going on then),
• along a strength dimension (how much or how little to say and at what
level of abstraction relative to ongoing activities)
and adjusting these attributes based on data on crew performance.
Developing effective feedback about automation activities requires thinking
about the new signals or indications in the context of other possible signals
and different kinds of situations. One cannot improve feedback or increase
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observability by adding a new indication or alarm to address each case one at a
time as they arise. A piecemeal approach will generate more displays, more
symbolic codings on displays, more sounds, more alarms. More data will be
available, but this will not be effective feedback because it challenges the
crew's ability to focus on and digest what is relevant in a particular situation.
Instead, we need to look at coherent sets and subsets of problems which all
point to the need for improved feedback to devise an integrated solution.
Our analysis of this one example has identified the relevant human-machine
performance targets, identified relevant scenarios for design and testing, set
some bounds on effective solutions, identified some tradeoffs that must be
balanced in design, and mentioned some of the factors that will need to be
explored in detail through prototypes and user testing. The example
illustrates the complexity of designing for observability.
5.4 Mechanisms to Manage Automated Resources
Giving users visibility into the machine agent's reasoning processes is only
one side of the coin in making machine agents into team players. Without
also giving the users the ability to direct the machine agent as a resourc_ in
their reasoning processes, the users are not in a significantly improved
position. They might be able to say what's wrong with the machine's
solution, but remain powerless to influence it in any way other than through
manual takeover. The computational power of machine agents provides a
great potential advantage, i.e., to free users from much of the mundane
legwork involved in working through large problems, thus allowing them to
focus on more critical high-level decisions. However, in order to make use of
this potential, the users need to be given the authority and capabilities to
make those decisions. This means giving them control over the problem
solution process.
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A commonly proposed remedy for this is to allow users to interrupt the
automated agent and take over the problem in its entirety in situations where
users determine that the machine agent is not solving a problem adequately.
Thus, the human is cast into the role of critiquing the machine, and the joint
system operates in essentially two modes - fully automatic or fully manual.
The system is a joint system only in the sense that either a human agent or a
machine agent can be asked to deal with the
productive sense of the human and machine
process of solving the problem. This method,
automated agent say "either you do it or I'll
problem, not in the more
agents cooperating in the
which is like having the
do it," has many obvious
drawbacks. Either the machine does the entire job without benefiting from
the practitioner's information and knowledge, and despite the brittleness of
the machine agents; or the user takes over in the middle of a deteriorating or
challenging situation without the support of cognitive tools. Previous work
in several domains (space operations, electronic troubleshooting, aviation)
and with different types of machine agents (expert systems, cockpit
automation, flight path planning algorithms) has shown that this is a poor
cooperative architecture. Instead, users need to be able to continue to work
with the automated agents in a cooperative manner by taking control of the
automated agents.
Using the machine agent as a resource may mean various things. In terms of
observability, one of the main challenges is to determine what levels and
modes of interaction will be meaningful to users. In some cases, the users
may want to take very detailed control of some portion of a problem,
specifying exactly what decisions are made and in what sequence, while in
others the users may want only to make very general, high level corrections
to the course of the solution in progress. Accommodating all of these
possibilities is difficult and requires very careful iterative analysis of the
interactions between user goals, situational factors, and the nature of the
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machine agent. However, this process is crucial if the joint system is to
perform effectively in the broadest possible range of scenarios.
5.5 Enhancing Human Expertise
The last area for investment in the interest of improving the human
contribution to safety is human expertise. It is ironic that the aviation
industry seems to be reducing this investment at the very time when it points
to human performance as a dominant contributor to accidents. This reflects
one of the myths about the impact of automation on human performance is
that, as investment in automation increases, less investment is needed in
human expertise. In fact, many sources have shown how increased
automation creates new and different knowledge and skill requirements.
In our investigations, we heard operational personnel say that the complexity
of the automated flight deck means that pilots need new knowledge about
how the different automated subsystems and modes function. We heard
about investigations that show how the complexity of the automated flight
deck makes it easy for pilots to develop oversimplified or erroneous mental
models of the tangled web of automation modes and transition logics. W e
heard from training departments struggling to teach crews how to manage
the automated systems as a resource in differing flight situations. Many
sources offered incidents where pilots were having trouble getting a particular
mode or level of automation to work successfully, where they persisted too
long trying to get this mode of automation to carry out their intentions
instead of switching to another means or a more direct means to accomplish
their flight path management goals. For example, someone may ask, "Why
didn't you turn it off?" Response: "It didn't do what it was supposed to, so I
tried to get it to do what I had programmed it to do." We heard how the new
knowledge and skill demands are most relevant in relatively rare situations
where different kinds of factors push events beyond the routine - just those
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circumstances that are most vulnerable to going sour through a progression
of misassessments and miscommunications. This increases the need to
practice those kinds of situations.
For training managers and departments, the result is a great deal of training
demands that must be fit into a small and shrinking training footprint. The
combination of new roles, knowledge and skills as a result of new levels of
automation with economic pressures creates a training double bind.
We heard about many tactics that have been developed to cope with this
mismatch. For example, one tactic is to focus transition training on just a
basic set of modes and leaving the remainder to be learned on the line. This
can create the ironic situation that training focuses on those parts of
managing automated systems that are the easiest to learn, while deferring the
most complicated parts for individuals to learn later on their own. This tactic
works:
• if the basics provide a coherent base that aids learning the more difficult
parts or for coordinating the automation in more difficult circumstances,
• if there is an environment that encourages, supports and checks
continued learning beyond minimum requirements.
Another tactic used to cope with this training double bind is to teach recipes.
It is a time efficient tactic and helps prevent students from being
overwhelmed by the complexity of the automated systems. Still, instructors
and training managers acknowledge the limits of this approach and try to go
beyond recipes as much as their time and resources limits allowed. All spoke
of the need for pilots to practice what they have learned in realistic
operational settings through line oriented simulation and line oriented flight
training scenarios, although the scope of this training is limited by the
economic and competitive forces squeezing training time. We saw evidence
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of an industry struggling to get better utilization of limited transition training
time and limited recurrent checks.
As the training footprint shrinks, one response is to identify and focus in on
the highest priority training needs. The US industry has increased freedom to
do so under new programs with the FAA (the advanced qualification
program or AQP). However, laudable as this is, it can inadvertently reduce
resources for training and practice even further. Economic pressure means
that the benefits of improvements will be taken in productivity (reaching the
same goal faster) rather than in quality (more effective training). Trying to
squeeze more yield from a shrinking investment in human expertise will not
help prevent the kinds of incidents and accidents that we label human error
after-the-fact.
Escaping from this double bind is essential. A first step is to recognize the
limits of minimum requirements. Instead, we should produce a culture
oriented towards continuous learning. Initial or transition training should
produce an initial proficiency for managing the automated flight deck. This
training should serve as the platform for mechanisms that support continued
growth of expertise. An emphasis on continuous improvement beyond
initial proficiency is needed because with highly automated systems we see an
increase in knowledge requirements and the range of situations that pilots
must be able to master. Developing accurate and useful mental models that
can be applied effectively across a wide range of possible conditions depends
on part-task or full mission practice in line-oriented situations.
The question then becomes how can we expand the opportunities to practice
the management of automated resources across a wide variety of situations
throughout a pilot's career? In many ways, the aviation industry is well
prepared to adopt this approach. Pilots, in general, want to improve their
knowledge and skills as evidenced by pilot-created guides to the automation
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that we noticed in several training centers. The industry already has invested
heavily in line-oriented training. New training technology in the form of
less expensive but high fidelity, part-task training devices is being utilized
more.
5.6 Coordination Among Stakeholders
These comments also illustrate a general theme that emerges from research
on Human Factors problems in industries with demands for very high levels
of performance. Representatives of each segment of industry are under
constraints and pressures (fit it all into this training footprint; minimize the
changes from the previous flight deck, etc.). Each group knows that they are
doing the best job possible given the constraints placed on them. So when
evidence of glitches arises, it is natural that they look for solutions in other
areas that contribute to flight deck performance, for example:
• trainers may advocate re-designing the system so that we can train people
to use it within this limited resource window,
• designers may advocate efforts to get ATC to accommodate our
automation's idiosyncrasies and capabilities,
• designers may encourage others to provide better training to enable people
to cope with the large set of interconnected features designed as a result of
multiple market demands,
• trainers may lobby for modified regulations so they are not forced to spend
precious training time on items of lower priority for glass aircraft.
None of these solutions is wrong in detail -- all of these areas can be
improved in isolation. But there is a deeper reading to these messages. This
kind of circular reaction to evidence of glitches is symptomatic of a deeper
need for coordination across areas that traditionally have functioned mostly
autonomously -- training, design, operational procedures, certification. Each
one of them, when considered alone, has improved a great deal, and this has
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created the generally extremely high safety levels in the aviation industry.
However, the risk of failure exemplified by the going sour scenario involves
the interaction or coupling between these individual areas.
In fact, increasing the level of automation increases the coupling between
these areas. For example, many recognize how automation designers, in part,
specify an operational philosophy. We have heard many people comment on
the inadequacy of a 'throw-it-over-the-wall' linkage between design and
training or between manufacturer and operator (and develop means to try to
reduce this). There needs to be a closer integration of these multiple
perspectives, in part, because of the advanced technology on new aircraft.
This example of coupling can be extended to show how many other areas
have become more inter-related with increased flight deck automation - air
traffic control (ATC) and advanced aircraft, safety and economics.
While improvements are still possible and desirable in each area as an
isolated entity, progress in general demands the integration of multiple
perspectives. In part, this is due to the fact that all parts of the system are
under intense economic pressure. This means that training no longer has the
room to make up for design deficiencies. Design for learnability becomes
another constraint on designers. ATC demands interact with the capabilities
and the limits of managing advanced aircraft, yet ATC is a system undergoing
change in the face of economic and performance pressures as well. A
complex departure procedure may seem to increase throughput, at least on
paper, but it may exact a price in terms of managing a clumsy team member --
the automation - and erode safety margins to some degree. Coordination is
needed precisely because change in any one part of the aviation system has
significant effects for other parts of the system.
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6 Conclusion
Overall, there are broad patterns behind the details of particular incidents and
accidents. We need to better guard against the kind of incident where people
and the automation seem to mismanage a minor occurrence or non-routine
situation into larger trouble - the going sour scenario. This scenario is a
symptom of breakdowns in coordination between people and machines
which in turn are a symptom of overall system complexity, at both
operational and organizational levels (Woods, 1996).
Second, we can tame needed complexity
• through better feedback to operational personnel,
• through more practice at managing automated resources in a wide range
of circumstances,
• by making the automation function as a team player,
• by creating "intuitive" automation designs that can be learned quickly,
through better mechanisms to detect or predict where automation design
will produce predictable kinds of human performance problems.
In general, we can act by first trying to limit the growth in complexity through
checking for excess complexity, valuing simplicity of operation, increasing
coordination between coupled areas.
Meeting the challenges of going sour scenarios in a coordinated manner is
extremely difficult because any change will exact costs on the parties
involved. Since the benefits are at a system level, it is easy for each party to
claim that they should not pay the costs, but that some other part of the
industry should. Since the aggregate safety level is very high (actuarial risk is
low), it is easy to ignore the threat of the going sour scenario and argue that
the status quo is sufficient. This is particularly easy because going sour
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incidents by definition involve several local contributing factors. Each case
looks like a unique combination of events with the dominant common factor
being human error. The certification and legal climate have produced a
climate where change creates exposure to financial and competitive risk. This
leads to minimum standards based on past practices ("you approved this
before"; "it was safe enough before") and progress crawls to a halt. Yet
progress, despite its pains, is exactly what is demanded if observed difficulties
such as the going sour scenario are to be addressed. The question for
regulators, manufacturers, and operators then is how to build the
collaborative environment that can enable constructive forward movement.
The goal of our research has been to point out specific areas for constructive
continuing progress and more general directions that may help create a
collaborative environment where progress is possible.
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